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Abstract
This paper studies the impact on firm value of tighter checks on bureaucrats’
behaviour. We use as a natural experiment the revision in 2015 by the
Communist Party of China (CPC) of its regulations on disciplinary actions. We
document a positive and substantial market reaction following this unexpected
policy change that tightened and formalised constraints on bureaucrats’
misconduct. The impact is less pronounced for firms with state ownership,
firms having CEOs or directors with CPC membership, and firms that operate
in provinces with better institutional quality. The subsequent revision in 2018
that enforced political obedience is not associated with a positive market
reaction.
Key words: anti-corruption; bureaucratic checks; China; firm value; natural
experiment
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1. Introduction
Recent research has emphasised the central role of state capacity in
promoting economic growth (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010; Acemoglu
et al., 2015). Bureaucrats are a critical part of state capacity: they deliver public
services and implement policies. It is therefore important to understand what
incentive schemes promote bureaucratic efficiency, and the consequences of
such schemes on the real economy. While the existing literature has generated
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tremendous insights on the positive effects of career incentives (Khan et al.,
2019; Bertrand et al., 2020), meritocratic recruitment (Rauch and Evans, 2000)
and competitive salaries (Dal Bó et al., 2013), the impact on performance of
constraining and deterring bureaucrats’ misconduct has rarely been studied.1
This article uses a natural experiment to examine the impact on perceived
bureaucratic efficiency and firm value of measures to strengthen checks on
bureaucrats. On 12 October 2015 and 27 August 2018, the Communist Party of
China (CPC), the ruling party that operates the entire Chinese bureaucracy,
revised party discipline. The first revision in 2015 put substantially more
emphasis on reducing bureaucratic misbehaviour, while the second, in 2018,
reiterated political obedience as members’ priority, and made little effort to
further improve bureaucratic efficiency. We exploit these events as exogenous
shocks to identify the impact on firm value of tightening the degree of
bureaucratic regulation. An increase in firm value following revisions of party
discipline would suggest a perceived improvement in bureaucratic efficiency,
and in firms’ operating environment.
Using daily stock returns of firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock
Exchanges,2 we discover that firms experience a substantial increase in value
after the first revision of party discipline, as measured by cumulative abnormal
returns (CARs) over either a 10- or 20-day event window, but they suffer from
a statistically significant loss in value after the second revision. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that while tightening bureaucratic regulation
improves the business environment and firm value (as evidenced by the first
revision), shifting the priority from constraining misconduct to political
agendas damages firms’ operating environment and share prices. Further
analyses reveal that these results are more pronounced for firms that are more
sensitive to changes in party discipline such as those vulnerable to misconduct
by officials through having low state ownership.
To better understand the link between tightening party discipline and firm
value, we conduct a large set of heterogeneous analyses based on institutional
features of firms’ locations, including the level of corruption, degree of
marketisation, quality of market intermediaries and legal environment, and
extent of private sector development. Our conjecture is that firms headquar-
tered in provinces with a higher quality of institutions would benefit less from a
tightening of party discipline, compared with their otherwise similar peers in
low institutional quality provinces. This hypothesis is based on the insight that
1Lin et al. (2016), Pan and Tian (2017), Xu and Yano (2017), Wang et al. (2018), Zhang
(2018), Gan and Xu (2019) and Hope et al. (2020) study the effects of China’s recent
anti-corruption campaign on various economic outcomes. They focus on a single event
with a single target (i.e., corruption), rather than a more general incentive scheme that
attempts to improve bureaucratic efficiency.
2Following the convention of the literature, we focus on the A-shares of listed firms on
both the main board and the small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) board.
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high-quality institutions are conducive to business activities (La Porta et al.,
1997, 1998; Djankov et al., 2008), and thus firms operating in places with high-
quality institutions enjoy a relatively healthy business environment before any
tightening of party discipline. In other words, constraining and deterring
bureaucrats’ misconduct through revising party discipline would add less value
to firms’ operating environment in provinces with high institutional quality.
Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that our results are driven mainly by
firms located in places with a higher level of corruption, lower degree of
marketisation, lower quality of legal system and lower extent of private sector
development.
Our findings shed light on the design of incentive structures in bureaucratic
systems. Two important features that distinguish bureaucratic organisation
from other organisations are the virtual absence of discretionary firing, and the
existence of seniority-based progression rules (Perry and Toonen, 1996; Van
der Meer et al., 2015). These features taken together often lead to disincen-
tivised civil servants. While existing research suggests that performance-based
rewards (Khan et al., 2019; Bertrand et al., 2020), meritocratic recruitment
(Rauch and Evans, 2000) and competitive salaries (Dal Bó et al., 2013) all have
a positive impact on bureaucratic performance, our findings highlight that
tightening the regulations on civil officers’ misbehaviour is another important
tool to improve the functioning of bureaucratic systems.
This article connects to the general literature on bureaucracy (Alesina and
Tabellini, 2007; Moe, 2012; Mookherjee, 2015; Besley and Ghatak, 2018). For
example, one stream of studies within this literature considers the impact on
various economic outcomes of allocating bureaucrats to serve in the areas they
originate from (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; Bandiera et al., 2018; Xu
et al., 2018). Another strand of research looks at how patronage affects
bureaucratic performance (Xu, 2018, 2019). Complementing these studies, we
examine the impact of restricting bureaucrats’ misbehaviour on the perceived
quality of the business environment, as reflected by firms’ stock returns.
The paper also contributes to the literature on firm political risk (Pástor and
Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Kelly et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017). Liu et al. (2017), for
example, study the political scandal of Bo Xilai in 2012 in China, showing that
firms that are politically sensitive suffer from a substantially larger drop in
share price compared to their otherwise similar peers. Our result, that firms
managed or owned by the state (i.e., the CPC) experience smaller jumps in their
share price than other firms after regulations of party members’ behaviour are
tightened, provides new evidence to this literature.
Our paper also speaks to the broad literature on law and finance (La Porta
et al., 1997, 1998), and is closely related to the debate on the impact of the
quality of the legal system on firm financing and growth in China (Allen et al.,
2005; Ayyagari et al., 2010). While Allen et al. (2005) argue that the legal
system is not as important as in developed economies for firm growth in China,
Ayyagari et al. (2010) find that Chinese firms grow faster if they obtain finance
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from the formal banking system, which is better protected by the legal system
than informal financing channels. Our finding that firms experience higher
stock returns after the revision of discipline in 2015, in places with a weak legal
environment, offers a potential resolution to the debate. That is, both the
formal legal system and informal legal institutions, including party discipline,
play an important role in supporting firm growth.
Lastly, this article connects to the recent literature that studies the impact of
China’s anti-corruption campaign on various economic and firm outcomes (Lin
et al., 2016; Pan and Tian, 2017; Xu and Yano, 2017; Zhang, 2018; Wang et al.,
2018; Gan and Xu, 2019; Liu and Ying, 2019; Hope et al., 2020). These studies
focus on a single event (i.e., the anti-corruption campaign) with a single target
(i.e., fighting corruption). Our paper, on the other hand, sheds light on the
more general incentive structure that aims to improve bureaucratic efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional
background on revisions in party discipline and develops our hypotheses.
Section 3 presents the data and introduces the key variables for the empirical
analyses. Section 4 describes our empirical strategy, and estimates the impact on
firm value of strengthening checks on bureaucrats. Section 5 concludes.
2. Institutional background and hypothesis development
In this section, we first briefly present background on the revisions of the
CPC’s party discipline in 2015 and 2018. We then develop our hypotheses on
the relationship between the tightening of party discipline and firm stock value.
2.1. Reforms of party discipline
The CPC revised its party discipline in 2015, and again in 2018. The first
revision on 12 October 2015 (henceforth, the 2015 revision) substantially
strengthened discipline aimed at constraining its members’ misbehaviour. In
particular, the 2015 revision tightened the regulations on three critical fronts.
First, relative to the previous version of party discipline, it placed much more
emphasis on regulating misbehaviour regarding political loyalty. For example,
the 2015 revision generated a ’list of misbehaviours’ that helps to spell out the
types of behaviour inhibited for party members. This list substantially reduced
the grey areas regarding bribes and extortion.3
In addition, party members are no longer allowed to organise and participate
in social networking events, such as alumni and hometown reunions. These
events are often exploited by bureaucrats, entrepreneurs and executives to
3For details, see Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Disciplinary Actions
(2015) is http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0827/c64094-30251913.html. Communist
Party of China on Disciplinary Actions (2003) is http://www.ipcas.ac.cn/dj/zcfg/
200908/t20090804_2315651.html.
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establish relationships that are later used to exchange favours. Lastly, the
degree of punishment for misconduct increased dramatically. For example,
there was an increase of 50 percent, from a year to a year and a half, in the
length of time during which opportunities for promotion are muted following
misbehaviour (e.g., taking bribes, lack of actions, abuse of power, etc.). This
has significant implications on party members’ well-being, since promotion
brings higher pay, final-salary pension, social status and prestige.
Figure 1 plots the search volume for ‘CPC discipline reform’, and ‘anti-
corruption’ as a reference, in Chinese. The search engine is Baidu, the
counterpart to Google in China. We find that the search volume for party-
discipline reform jumped four-fold, from 500 to 2,500, around the date of the
2015 revision, while search intensity for the anti-corruption campaign, a major
event preceding the party-discipline reform, decreased slightly. These patterns
suggest that (a) the 2015 revision attracted a substantial amount of attention
from the public, and (b) the public is able to distinguish the CPC discipline
reform from the anti-corruption campaign initiated in 2012.
The CPC revised its party discipline again on 27 August, 2018 (henceforth,
the 2018 revision). However, the 2018 revision emphasised political obedience
as the top priority of its members, and made little effort to further improve
bureaucratic efficiency. As noted by several state-owned news media,4 the goal
of the 2018 revision is to firmly uphold President Xi’s leadership and to
strengthen the centralised authority of the CPC.
2.2. Hypothesis development
Theories about bureaucratic efficiency imply that the optimal bureaucratic
performance critically depends on the incentives and ability of bureaucrats
(Bertrand et al., 2020). Empirical research provides support for both routes.
While merit-based rewards (Khan et al., 2019) and competitive salaries (Dal Bó
et al., 2013) improve bureaucratic performance through stronger incentives,
meritocratic recruitment (Rauch and Evans, 2000) does so through increasing
the ability of staff. We argue that constraining party members’ misconduct
strengthens the incentive component of bureaucratic performance, since strict
party discipline increases both the extent and degree of being stripped of
promotion opportunities. As mentioned above, promotion in bureaucratic
organisations has significant welfare implications.
A key insight from the literature on institutions and growth is that higher
quality institutions, including a faster business registration process (Djankov
et al., 2002), reduced backlogs in court (Djankov et al., 2003), stronger contract
enforcement (Djankov et al., 2007) and a lower level of corruption (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995), support stronger growth of firms. The quality of
4For example, see People’s Daily at http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0828/c1001-
30254362.html.
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institutions in China depends critically on the performance of CPC party
members, since they occupy most senior civil service positions and are
responsible for operating nearly all government organs (Xu, 2011; Francois
et al., 2016). Taken together, we hypothesise that the tightening of party
discipline after the 2015 revision would increase bureaucratic performance as
well as the quality of institutions, and that this positive impact is recognised in
a timely manner by the investing public, and is reflected in stock prices5 (as
evidenced in Figure 1). Thus, our hypothesis is stated as follows6:
H1: Cumulative abnormal announcement returns around the 2015 revision are
positive.
The 2018 revision, discussed in the previous section, shifted emphasis from
bureaucratic efficiency to political loyalty. It re-enshrined political obedience as
the top priority for all party members, and exerted little effort to further
improve bureaucratic performance. It is important to note that the 2018
revision may have changed the utility function of bureaucrats away from
maximising performance, towards minimising political disobedience, which is
often argued to be the main reason for bureaucrats’ reluctance to act.7 We
Figure 1 Baidu search index. This figure plots the search volume for ’CPC discipline reform’, and
’anti-corruption’ (dotted line) as a reference, in Chinese from Baidu, the counterpart search engine
to Google in China. The solid line represents the search intensity of the keywords ’CPC discipline
reform’ and dash line represents the search intensity of the keyword ’anti-corruption’.
5Alternatively, we can think of the tightening of party discipline as reducing the
coordination costs between firms and government entities (Coase, 1937; An and Rau
2019).
6The event study method is commonly used to study the impact of a regulatory change
that attempts to improve business institutions (Lin et al., 2011; Berkowitz et al., 2015).
For example, Berkowitz et al. (2015) use CARs, with various event windows, to
investigate the impact of property-law enactment on firm value in China. They find that
firms experience substantial value gains, as reflected in higher CARs, immediately after
the enactment. Furthermore, they document a similar mechanism via which property-
law enactment influences firms’ earnings potential: improvement in business institutions.
7For example, see ‘Coronavirus crisis shows China’s governance failure’, New York
Times, 2020, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/business/china-corona
virus-government.html.
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argue that the revision of party discipline in 2018 had a negative impact on
bureaucratic efficiency, thereby damaging institutional quality and firms’
operating environment. Our second hypothesis is thus as follows:
H2: Cumulative abnormal announcement returns around the 2018 revision are
negative.
If the 2015 party-discipline revision resulted in a positive impact on stock
prices through improving the perceived quality of institutions and the business
environment, then returns on announcement should be higher for firms
operating under an institutional disadvantage (i.e., lack of political favour, long
delays in dealing with government organs, etc.). We construct 11 proxies of
institutional disadvantage at both firm and location level, along three different
dimensions, namely state ownership, executives’ affiliation with the CPC and
provincial institutional quality. We hypothesise that returns around the 2015
revision should be larger for firms with lower state ownership, fewer (or less
important) CPC-affiliated executives, and their headquarters in provinces with
a higher level of corruption, lower degree of marketisation, lower quality of
intermediate legal system and less developed private sector. Our hypothesis is
therefore stated as follows:
H3: Positive cumulative abnormal returns around the 2015 party-discipline revision
are more pronounced for firms with lower state ownership, fewer CPC-affiliated
executives, and their headquarters in provinces with a higher level of corruption, lower
degree of marketisation, lower quality of the intermediate legal system and less
developed private sector.
3. Data, sample and key variables
3.1. Sample, data source and dependent variables
We rely on the China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database
(CSMAR), supported by GTA Information Technology, for financial infor-
mation on firms. Our dataset contains all non-financial firms publicly traded
for at least one year in the main or SME boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen
Stock Exchanges in mainland China. Following the convention in the
literature, we focus only on the A-shares of listed firms (Liu et al., 2017). In
total, our sample contains 2,104 firms for analyses of the 2015 revision, and
3,109 for the 2018 revision. We use the announcement dates of the discipline
revisions as event dates to calculate the 10- and 20-day cumulative abnormal
returns centred around the events. The market portfolio employed in our
calculation is the China Security Index 300 (CSI 300), a capitalisation-weighted
stock market index designed to replicate the performance of the top 300 stocks
traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. The estimation
window is 250 days. Our dependent variables for H3 are constructed from
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these abnormal returns. In particular, CAR(−5,5) and CAR(−10,10) are the
10- and 20-day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcements of
party-discipline revisions.
3.2. Measures of state influence
CSMAR also provides information on firm ownership structure. We
construct three sets of measures on the extent to which a firm is owned or
managed by the state. The first set includes SOE, which is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if a firm’s controlling shareholder is a government entity, and 0
otherwise. SOE(local) and SOE(central) are two auxiliary measures. SOE
(local) equals 1 if a firm’s controlling shareholder is a local-government entity,
and 0 otherwise, while SOE(central) is equal to 1 if a firm’s controlling
shareholder is a central government organ, and 0 otherwise. Chen et al. (2009)
show that the type of state ownership matters for a firm’s operating efficiency.
We relate their insight to the effects of party discipline on firm stock returns,
and expect firms with different types of state ownership to experience different
levels of share-price response.
Our second set of measures is based on the varying percentages of firm
shares owned by the state. These measures are important to our analyses
because they not only capture the status (either state or private) of the
controlling shareholder, but also reflect the extent of state influence below
the controlling shareholder threshold. In particular, State Holding is the
share of stocks of a firm owned by a government entity. Similar to our first
set of state ownership variables, we construct two auxiliary measures based
on the findings of Chen et al. (2009). State Holding(local) and State Holding
(central) are the shares of stocks of a firm owned by a local and central
government entity, respectively.
The last set of indicators includes Party(CEO), Party(Board) and Party
(Chair). Specifically, Party(CEO) is equal to 1 if a firm’s chief executive officer
(CEO) is a member of the CPC, and 0 if not. Party(Board) is the proportion of
CPC members on a firm’s board. Party(Chair) is assigned a value of 1 if the
board chairman is a member of the CPC, and 0 otherwise. These measures
capture the extent to which a firm is managed by members of the CPC, and are
complementary to the state ownership variables.
3.3. Measures of provincial institutional quality and control variables
As discussed in Section 2.2, we expect firms that are operating in places
with low institutional quality to experience stronger share price jumps
following the 2015 revision. To measure the institutional quality of a firm’s
operating environment, we construct four proxies that capture the level of
corruption, the degree of marketisation, the function of the intermediate
legal system, and the extent of private sector development in provinces where
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the firm has its headquarters. Note that it is reasonable to construct
measures of institutional quality at the provincial level, as firms are mainly
interacting with provincial government entities and officials, for example to
obtain business licenses, apply for an initial public offering (IPO), file legal
cases, extend credit lines, etc.
Our measures of corruption include Corruption(Money) and Corruption
(Officials). These measures are the total amount of bribe money, in millions of
yuan, and the total number of local corrupt officials revealed in each province
since the anti-corruption campaigns in November 2012 up to the party-
discipline reform of 12 October 2015, respectively. To measure the degree of
marketisation, we calculate the average value of the marketisation index
constructed by Fan et al. (2016) from 2009 to 2015 (Market Index). NS Index is
constructed from one of the sub-components of Market Index, and it measures
the degree of private sector development in a province. MIOLaw Index,
another sub-component of Market Index, captures the quality of the interme-
diate legal system in each province. Again, we use the average values for NS
Index and MIOLaw Index over the 2009–2015 period.
In all the regression analyses, we control for various firm characteristics that
may have an impact on cumulative abnormal returns. These firm traits consist
of MarketValue, which is the natural logarithm of firm market value,
DebtRatio, which equals the ratio of total debt to total asset, ROA, which is
net income over total assets, and various measures of corporate governance
quality, such as Duality, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm
CEO also acts as board chair and 0 otherwise, Board, which equals the total
number of board directors, and Independent, which is the proportion of
independent directors on the board. All information is obtained from CSMAR.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of these variables.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Graphical evidence
We start with a graphical presentation of our key results. In Figure 2, we plot
the value-weighted average of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all
firms in a 30-day window surrounding the 2015 (CAR2015) and 2018 revisions
(CAR2018). The time-series patterns of the value-weighted average CARs
exhibit a substantial jump immediately after the 2015 revision, but show a
slight decrease following the 2018 revision. These initial results are consistent
with our hypotheses that the tightening of party discipline after the 2015
revision increases bureaucratic performance as well as the quality of institu-
tions, and that this positive impact is recognised by the public and reflected in
abnormal stock returns.
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Table 1
Summary statistics of key variables
Observations Mean SD Min Max 25 50 75
CAR(−5, 5) 2,134 10.433 10.517 −46.245 75.444 4.363 9.935 15.752
CAR(−10, 10) 2,134 14.388 15.731 −68.802 124.453 5.486 14.213 23.527
SOE 2,134 0.411 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SOE(local) 2,134 0.272 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
SOE(central) 2,134 0.139 0.346 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
State Holding 2,134 16.023 21.540 0.000 89.090 0.000 0.000 33.020
State Holding
(local)
2,134 10.523 18.970 0.000 84.110 0.000 0.000 19.210
State Holding
(central)
2,134 5.493 14.828 0.000 89.090 0.000 0.000 0.000
Non-SOE
Holding
2,134 18.495 18.815 0.000 89.990 0.000 17.410 32.080
Party(CEO) 2,000 0.279 0.449 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Party(Board) 2,066 0.188 0.219 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.111 0.308
Party(Chair) 2,066 0.366 0.482 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
MarketValue 2,134 16.239 0.811 14.978 19.016 15.626 16.070 16.682
DebtRatio 2,134 0.451 0.216 0.062 0.937 0.274 0.437 0.620
ROA 2,134 0.030 0.056 −0.191 0.190 0.009 0.029 0.056
Duality 2,111 0.243 0.429 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Board 2,133 8.659 1.813 5.000 15.000 7.000 9.000 9.000
Independent 2,133 0.376 0.054 0.313 0.600 0.333 0.364 0.429
Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix.
Figure 2 Abnormal returns around the reform in 2015. This figure displays the value-weighted
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from 10 trading days before and 20 days after the CPC
discipline reform on 12 October 2015 (CAR2015) and 27 August 2018 (CAR2018).
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4.2. Main results
In this subsection, we present the results from the event studies of the 2015
and 2018 revisions. In particular, we use the announcement dates of the
discipline revisions, 12 October 2015 and 27 August 2018, as event dates to
calculate the 10- and 20-day cumulative abnormal returns centred around the
events. In addition, we also estimate CARs separately for state-owned (SOE)
and non-state-owned (non-SOE) firms. As discussed in Section 2.2, if party-
discipline revisions affect stock prices through changing the perceived institu-
tional quality and firm operating environment, then firms that are disadvan-
taged (non-SOE) should experience stronger responses from the stock market.
Table 2 presents the results.
Consistent with the graphical evidence, we find that all firms experience a
substantial jump in share price after the 2015 revision, and they all suffer from a
loss immediately after the 2018 revision. This is consistent with our hypotheses.
That is, constraining (relaxing) party members’ misconduct increases (decreases)
bureaucratic performance as well as the quality of institutions, and the impact is
captured in positive (negative) abnormal stock returns. The economic magnitude
is also substantial. For example, consider the 10-day CARs after the 2015
revision. The average CAR following the 2015 revision is more than 10 percent,
while the market return in 2015 is only 5.58 percent.8 For another example,
consider the estimate for the 10-day window CARs after the 2018 revision. It
suggests that the average CAR after the 2018 revision is −1.29 percent. This
represents an economically large decrease, considering that the negative impact
of the Bo scandal estimated in Liu et al. (2017) is only −1.3 percent.
Table 2 also shows that the impact of party-discipline revisions on firm value
is more pronounced for non-state-owned firms. This is consistent with H3:
firms that operate under an institutional disadvantage experience a stronger
response in absolute terms from the stock market. Estimates of the impact
differentials are large in magnitude. They range from 4.3 to 6.5 percent for the
2015 revision (a more positive CAR for non-state-owned firms) and −0.4 to
−0.8 percent for the 2018 revision (a more negative CAR for such firms), and
correspond to a lion’s share of the 2015 market return (5.6 percent) and the
impact of the Bo scandal (Liu et al., 2017) (−1.3 percent), respectively.
4.3. Heterogeneous analyses based on firm-level variations
Tobetter understand the relationship between the tightening of party discipline
and firm value, we conduct a large set of heterogeneous analyses based on the
degree of state ownership, institutional features of firms’ locations (including the
level of corruption), degreeofmarketisation,qualityofmarket intermediaries and
8This is calculated based on the CSI 300 Index.
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legal environment, and extent of private sector development. In particular, we
estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) model as follows:
CARi,t ¼ αþβheteroi=pþδXiþη jþ λpþ ɛi,t (1)
where CARi,t is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i during time window
t. As discussed in Section 3.1, we use either a 10- or 20-day time window
centred around the event dates. heteroi=p denotes a general measure of the
heterogeneous features of either a firm, i, or a firm location, p. Xi is a vector of
firm characteristics, including MarketValue, DebtRatio, ROA, Duality, Board
and Independent. These variables are defined in Section 3.3. We also include
industry and province fixed effects, denoted as η j and λp, where possible. ɛi,t is
the error term. Our standard errors are two-way clustered at the province and
industry level.
Table 3reportstheheterogeneouseffectsoftheparty-disciplinerevisions in2015
onfirmabnormalreturns,basedondifferent levelsofstateownership.InPanelAof
both tables, ourmeasureof stateownership isSOE,SOE(local)orSOE(central),
while in Panel B, the measure of state ownership is State Holding, State Holding
(local), or State Holding(central), all defined in Section 3.2. Consistent with our
hypotheses, we find that state-owned firms (and firms with a larger share of state
ownership), which operate under institutional advantages, experience a smaller
increase in CARs following the 2015 revision, suggesting that themarket believes
that some of their privileges will be restricted. Also, in line withChen et al. (2009),
we discover that firms that are controlled (or partially owned) by a local
Table 2
Stock market reactions
All firms SOEs Non-SOEs Difference
Panel A: Market reaction during reform 2015
CAR(−10, 10) 14.387*** 10.539*** 17.077*** 6.537***
CAR(−5, 5) 10.432*** 7.915*** 12.192*** 4.276***
Panel B: Market reaction during reform 2018
CAR(−10, 10) −0.933*** −0.375* −1.203*** −0.828***
CAR(−5, 5) −1.269*** −1.026*** −1.386*** −0.360*
This table presents the results from the event studies of the 2015 and 2018 revisions. In
particular, the event dates are 12 October 2015 and 27 August 2018. The event window is
either 10- or 20-day around the events. The market portfolio employed in the calculation is
the China Security Index 300 (CSI 300), a value-weighted stock market index designed to
replicate the performance of the top 300 shares traded in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock
exchanges.
© 2020 The Authors. Accounting & Finance published by John Wiley & Sons Australia,
Ltd on behalf of Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand
12 J. An et al./Accounting & Finance
government entity have a less positive stock market response than their
counterparts owned by the central government. This suggests that firms under
local government control may lose some privileges when interacting with local
government entities and officials, for example in obtaining business licenses, filing
legal cases, seeking extensions to credit lines, etc. Our interpretation is that these
firmsenjoyedmorepreferential treatmentsbefore2015, throughbriberyandother
forms of corruption.
Table 4 reports the results of the further revision of the party-discipline
revisions in 2018. While the overall market reaction is negative, firms owned by
Table 3
Stock market reaction to 2015 reform: heterogeneous impact based on levels of state ownership
Panel A: State enterprises during the 2015 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
SOE −1.659*** −2.341***
[−3.542] [−2.913]
SOE(local) −2.065*** −2.800***
[−3.998] [−3.005]
SOE(central) −0.878 −1.748*
[−1.516] [−1.892]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 56.392*** 57.498*** 94.868*** 95.866***
[8.198] [8.320] [9.696] [9.816]
R2 0.148 0.149 0.159 0.159
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104
Panel B: State ownership during the 2015 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
State Holding −0.044*** −0.056***
[−4.051] [−3.826]
State Holding(local) −0.052*** −0.064***
[−4.378] [−3.465]
State Holding
(central)
−0.030** −0.044**
[−2.090] [−2.300]
Non-SOE Holding 0.038*** 0.054***
[3.119] [3.284]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(continued)
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the state or with a higher share of state ownership suffer from a smaller amount
of loss. The results suggest that investors believe that the 2018 revision, which
stressed obedience to Xi Jinping’s highest authority, would not add value to
firms and that firms with state control or ownership still enjoy certain
institutional benefits. In addition, it is possible that investors learned from past
experience that party-discipline regulation in itself does not effectively improve
legal institutions in China. The obedience could also make bureaucrats lose
their discretion to adjust policies to local conditions or to manoeuvre around
bad laws (An et al., 2019b). In untabulated results, we show that the 2015
revision was not associated with higher subsequent operating performance of
firms, suggesting that the positive reaction to the 2015 regulation may have
been optimistic. Meanwhile, China’s ranking in the Corruption Perceptions
Index, published annually by Transparency International, deteriorated from
83rd in 2015 to 87th in 2018 worldwide.
In Table 5, we replace the indicators of state ownership with measures of
executive affiliations with the CPC. In particular, we use Party(CEO), Party
(Board) and Party(Chair) as our main variables of interest in model (1), all of
which are defined in Section 3.2. We uncover that firms managed by a CPC-
Table 3 (continued)
Panel B: State ownership during the 2015 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 55.032*** 55.899*** 55.954*** 93.194*** 93.940*** 94.252***
[8.059] [8.209] [7.882] [9.466] [9.687] [9.394]
R2 0.149 0.150 0.148 0.159 0.159 0.159
Observations 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104 2,104
This table reports the heterogeneous impact of the party-discipline reform on 12October 2015 on
firmabnormal returns basedon the different degrees of state ownership. The dependent variable in
Panel A is either CAR(−5, 5) or CAR(−10, 10). Our variables of interest in Panel A are state-
ownership indicators: SOE, a dummy variable equal to one if the ultimate shareholder is a
government entity and zero otherwise, SOE(local) and SOE(central), which are indicators for
local-government-owned firms and central government-owned firms. In Panel B our variables of
interest are State Holding, State Holding(local), State Holding(central), and Non-SOE Holding
which are the percentage of shareholdings held by government entities, local-government entities,
central government entities, and private investors, respectively. We control for firm financial
characteristics, namelyMarketValue,DebtRatio andROA, andmeasures of corporate governance
quality including Duality, Board and Independent. All variables are defined in the Appendix. We
also includeprovinceand industryfixed effects inall regressions.All firmvariables arewinsorisedat
1 and 99 percent levels. Standard errors are clustered at the province and industry level and t-
statistics are in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance levels at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
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affiliated chief executive officer experience lower abnormal returns after the
2015 revision, compared to their otherwise similar peers. Similar relationships
are also found in firms with a CPC-affiliated board chair and with a higher
Table 4
Stock market reaction to 2018 reform: heterogeneous impact based on levels of state ownership
Panel A: State enterprises during the 2018 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
SOE 0.264 0.932**
[1.408] [2.625]
SOE(local) 0.089 0.362
[0.410] [1.323]
SOE(central) 0.555* 1.833***
[1.861] [3.355]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −3.044 −2.842 9.495** 10.119**
[−1.113] [−1.021] [2.092] [2.210]
R2 0.034 0.034 0.045 0.047
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109 3,109
Panel B: State ownership during the 2018 reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
State Holding 0.008* 0.027***
[1.882] [2.932]
State Holding(local) 0.005 0.013*
[1.006] [1.701]
State Holding(central) 0.012 0.049***
[1.508] [3.446]
Non-SOE Holding 0.000 −0.015*
[0.093] [−1.796]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept −2.901 −2.771 −3.268 9.984** 10.622** 9.385**
[−1.063] [−0.989] [−1.202] [2.194] [2.307] [2.072]
R2 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.047 0.048 0.044
Observations 3,109 3,109 3,109 3,109 3,109 3,109
This table reports the heterogeneous impact of the party-discipline reform on 27 August 2018
on firm abnormal returns based on the different degrees of state ownership. The dependent
variable is either CAR(−5, 5) or CAR(−10, 10). Other details are as in Table 3.
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proportion of CPC-affiliated board members. This is, again, consistent with
H3. That is, the positive CARs around the 2015 party-discipline revision is
smaller for firms that have an institutional advantage prior to the discipline
revision.
4.4. Heterogeneous analyses based on provincial variations in institutional
quality
As we hypothesise in Section 2.2, the relationship between the tightening of
party discipline and firm value depends not only on firm status (state-owned
versus private), but also on the quality of regional institutions (An et al.,
2019a). If the 2015 party-discipline revision has a positive impact on firm value
through improving the quality of institutions, then firms operating in an
environment with better institutions (i.e., absence of political favouritism, no
delays in dealing with government entities, etc.) should benefit less from the
discipline revision. In Table 6, we present separate results of estimating model
(1) for provinces with low and high levels of corruption, with Non-SOE as our
Table 5
Stock market reaction to 2015 reform: heterogeneous impact based on firm executives’ party
membership
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
Party(CEO) −0.952** −1.867**
[−2.360] [−2.269]
Party(Board) −3.011*** −4.365***
[−3.299] [−4.563]
Party(Chair) −1.159*** −1.777***
[−4.320] [−3.513]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 55.505*** 54.844*** 54.733*** 93.471*** 93.898*** 93.739***
[7.519] [8.537] [8.292] [8.897] [9.779] [9.605]
R2 0.146 0.136 0.135 0.156 0.147 0.146
Observations 1,983 2,039 2,039 1,983 2,039 2,039
This table reports the heterogeneous impact of the party-discipline reform of 12 October 2015
on firm abnormal returns based on their executives’ party membership. The dependent
variable is either CAR(−5, 5) or CAR(−10, 10). Our variables of interest are party
membership indicators Party(CEO) in columns (1) and (4), which is a dummy variable if the
firm CEO is a CPC member, Party(Board) in columns (2) and (5), which is equal to the
percentage of board members who are also CPC members, and Party(Chair) in columns (3)
and (6), which is a dummy variables that equals one if the board chair is a CPC member.
Other details are as in Table 3.
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Table 6
Stock market reaction to 2015 reform: heterogeneous impact based on the level of corruption in
firm locations
Panel A: Total value of bribe money in million yuan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
Low High Low High
Non-SOE 1.569 1.307*** 3.032 2.435**
[1.644] [4.473] [1.670] [2.852]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 35.833*** 54.836*** 70.218*** 89.178***
[4.281] [9.747] [6.514] [8.985]
R2 0.053 0.159 0.084 0.156
Observations 736 1,123 736 1,123
Panel B: Total value of bribe money in million yuan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
Low High Low High
Non-SOE 1.277 1.749** 2.342 2.437**
[1.393] [2.899] [1.535] [2.386]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 51.538*** 60.083*** 102.746*** 91.295***
[4.383] [7.740] [9.600] [5.989]
R2 0.081 0.188 0.139 0.174
Observations 712 1,157 712 1,157
This table reports the heterogeneous impact of the party-discipline reform of 12 October 2015
on firm abnormal returns based on the level of corruption in firm locations. In Panel A, we
divide firm locations into low- and high-corruption areas based on Corruption(Money),
which is the total value of bribe money in million yuan revealed since the anti-corruption
campaigns started in 2012 until the party-discipline reform on 12 October 2015. In Panel B,
we divide firms into low- and high-corruption areas based on Corruption(Officials), which is
the total number of local corrupt officials revealed since the anti-corruption campaigns
started in 2012 up to the party-discipline reform on 12 October 2015. The dependent variable
is either CAR(−5, 5) or CAR(−10, 10). Our variable of interest is the state-ownership
indicator Non-SOE, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is a
private entity and 0 otherwise. Other details are as in Table 3.
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key variable of interest. Non-SOE is equal to 1 if the controlling shareholder of
a firm is a private entity, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with H3, our results are
driven by firms with headquarters located in high corruption provinces.
In Table 7, we consider several other institutional features that are highly
relevant for a firm’s operating environment, including the degree of
Table 7
Stock market reaction to 2015 reform: heterogeneous impact based on the quality of institutions in
firm locations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
High Low High Low
Panel A: Market Index
SOE −1.541*** −1.800 −1.942** −2.631
[−3.179] [−1.365] [−2.486] [−1.448]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 60.367*** 36.180*** 102.397*** 63.534***
[7.653] [3.413] [9.706] [3.632]
R2 0.149 0.113 0.159 0.187
Observations 1,747 341 1,747 341
Panel B: NS Index
SOE −1.238** −3.292*** −2.028** −3.188
[−2.195] [−5.121] [−2.173] [−1.747]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 54.388*** 63.333*** 91.917*** 102.960***
[6.985] [4.671] [10.312] [4.946]
R2 0.120 0.212 0.136 0.215
Observations 1,536 552 1,536 552
Panel C: MIOLaw Index
SOE −1.833*** −0.803 −2.602** −1.036
[−3.046] [−0.838] [−2.877] [−0.517]
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Province FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 56.926*** 51.056*** 98.710*** 76.656***
(continued)
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marketisation (Market Index), the quality of the intermediate legal system
(MIOLaw Index), and the extent of private sector development (NS Index), in
the province where the relevant firm’s headquarters is situated. We again
present separate results of estimating model (1) for low- and high-quality
regions along these institutional dimensions. Consistent with H3, we discover
that our results are driven mainly by firms located in provinces with a lower
degree of marketisation, lower quality of intermediate legal system, and lesser
extent of private sector development.
5. Conclusion
This paper exploits a natural experiment to examine the impact on perceived
bureaucratic efficiency and firm value of strengthening of checks on bureau-
crats. We discover that firms experience a significant increase in share price
after the first party-discipline revision in 2015, as measured by the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) over either a 10- or 20-day event window, but suffer a
loss of firm value after the second revision in 2018. Our interpretation is that,
while increasing the regulation of bureaucrats helps improve firms’ operating
environment and thus firm value, shifting the priority from constraining
misbehaviour to pursuit of political goals hurts firms’ operating environment
and value. We also find that these results are more pronounced for firms that
are more sensitive to changes in party discipline, such as firms that are not
Table 7 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR(−5, 5) CAR(−10, 10)
High Low High Low
[7.336] [4.415] [9.014] [6.562]
R2 0.147 0.126 0.155 0.182
Observations 1,711 382 1,711 382
This table reports the heterogeneous impact of the party-discipline reform of 12 October 2015
on firm abnormal returns based on the institutional quality of firm locations. In Panel A, we
divide firm locations into low and high marketisation areas based on Market Index, which is
the average value of the marketisation index from 2009 to 2015. In Panel B, we divide firms
into high and low institutional quality areas according to the NS Index for firm locations,
which measures the level of development of the non-state sector. In Panel C, we group the
firms into low and high institutional quality places based on the MIOLaw Index, which
measures the quality of the legal system in firm locations. The dependent variable is either
CAR(−5, 5) or CAR(−10, 10). Our variable of interest is the state-ownership indicator SOE,
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is a government entity, and 0
otherwise. Other details are as in Table 3.
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protected through being managed or owned by the state. In several extension
analyses, we also uncover that the results are driven mainly by firms located in
provinces with lower institutional quality, which supports our proposed
channel of influence.
Our paper is relevant to the design of incentive structures in bureaucratic
organisations. While previous literature suggests that performance-based
rewards (Khan et al., 2019; Bertrand et al., 2020), meritocratic recruitment
(Rauch and Evans, 2000) and competitive salaries (Dal Bó et al., 2013)
contribute to increased bureaucratic efficiency, we highlight that tightening the
regulations on bureaucrats’ misbehaviour also improves the functioning of a
bureaucracy.
This article connects to several strands of literature. First, it adds to the
general literature on bureaucracy (Alesina and Tabellini, 2007; Moe, 2012;
Mookherjee, 2015; Besley and Ghatak, 2018). In particular, we investigate the
impact of restricting bureaucrats’ misconduct on the quality of the firm’s
operating environment, as captured by firm stock returns. We also contribute
to the literature on firm political risk (Pástor and Veronesi, 2012, 2013; Kelly
et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017). Consistent with Liu et al. (2017), for example, we
find that firms managed or owned by the state (i.e., the CPC) experience weaker
stock market reactions immediately after the discipline revisions, relative to
non-state-owned counterparts. This paper also speaks to the broad literature
on law and finance (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) and the recent literature that
studies the impact of China’s anti-corruption campaign on various economic
and firm outcomes (Lin et al., 2016; Pan and Tian, 2017; Xu and Yano, 2017;
Zhang, 2018; Wang et al., 2018; Gan and Xu, 2019; An et al., 2019; Hope et al.,
2020). While these literatures tend to focus on a single dimension of
bureaucrats’ misbehaviour, our article studies the general incentive scheme
within bureaucratic organisations.
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Appendix
Variable description
Variable Description
Panel A: Dependent variables
CAR(−5, 5) Cumulative abnormal return from 5 days before to 5 days after the
event (announcement of a reform of party discipline). The market
model is estimated for each firm over a 250 trading-day period, from
days −311 through −61 relative to the event day 0 (the announcement
date):
Reti,t ¼ αiþβiRetM,tþ ɛi,t
where Reti,t is the stock return for stock i on day t and RetM,t is the
return on the market portfolio, measured by the CSI 300 Index. Using
the estimated coefficients α
i
and β
i
, the abnormal return for each day τ
in the event window is:
AReti,τ ¼Reti,τðα
i
þβ
i
RetM,τÞ
CAR(−5, 5) is calculated as ∑5τ¼5AReti,τ. Source of share data:
CSMAR
CAR(−10, 10) As above but using an event window of 10 days around the event
date.
Panel B: Firm-level variables
SOE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder is a
government entity, and 0 otherwise. Source: CSMAR
SOE(local) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is a government
entity and subject to the local government, and 0 otherwise. Source:
CSMAR
SOE(central) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is a government
entity and subject to the central government, and 0 otherwise. Source:
CSMAR
Non-SOE Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ultimate shareholder is a private
investor, and 0 otherwise. Source: CSMAR
State Holding Percentage of shares held by a government entity. Source: CSMAR
State Holding(local) Percentage of shares held by a local-government entity. Source:
CSMAR
State Holding(central) Percentage of shares held by a central government entity. Source:
CSMAR
Non-SOE Holding Percentage of shares held by private investors. Source: CSMAR
Party(CEO) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO of the firm is a CPC member,
and 0 otherwise. Source: CSMAR
Party(Board) Proportion of CPC-affiliated board members on the board. Source:
CSMAR
Party(Chair) Dummy variable equal to 1 if the board chair is a CPC member, and 0
otherwise. Source: CSMAR
MarketValue Natural logarithm of market value for each firm. Source: CSMAR
DebtRatio Total debt over total assets. Source: CSMAR
ROA Return on assets, which is the ratio of net income over total assets.
Source: CSMAR
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(continued)
Variable Description
Duality Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm CEO also acts as board chair.
Source: CSMAR
Board Total number of board members for each firm. Source: CSMAR
Independent Proportion of independent directors on the board. Source: CSMAR
Panel C: Province-level variables
Corruption(Money) Total value of bribe money in million yuan for each province revealed
by the anti-corruption reforms in 2012 up to the reform of party
discipline on 12 October 2015. ‘Lower corruption’ is defined as ‘firm’s
headquarters is located in a province which has a value below the
sample median’. Source: Hand-collected data from public
announcements of investigations made by Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection
Corruption(Officials) Total number of corrupt local officials for each province revealed by
the anti-corruption campaign in 2012 up to the reform of party
discipline on 12 October 2015. ‘Lower corruption’ is defined as ‘firm’s
headquarters is located in a province which has a value below the
sample median’. Source: Hand-collected data from public
announcements of investigations made by Central Commission for
Discipline Inspection
Mkt Index Average value of the marketisation index from 2009 to 2015. ‘High
marketisation’ is defined as ‘firm’s headquarters is located in a
province which has a value above the sample median’. Source: Fan
et al. (2016).
NS Index Average value of the sub-index of the marketisation index which is the
score of the development of the non-state enterprise sector from 2009
to 2015. ‘High non-state enterprise sector development’ is defined as
‘firm’s headquarters is located in a province which has a value above
the sample median’. Source: Fan et al. (2016)
MIOLaw Index Average value of the sub-index of the marketisation index which is the
score of the quality of market intermediaries and legal environment
from 2009 to 2015. ‘High quality’ is defined as ‘firm’s headquarters is
located in a province which has a value above the sample median’.
Source: Fan et al. (2016)
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